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1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate a license contract of a vertically separated market in the presence of
asymmetric information and competition. An upstream firm wants to conclude a license contract
for its patented technology with a downstream firm, but a follower can challenge the technology
at some point, and the downstream firm does not know how long the monopoly of the patented
technology will last. Upon challenge, the patent holder files a lawsuit over infringement, and the
court’s ruling is based on the technology’s true novelty. If the leader wins the trial, it maintains
the monopolistic position in the market, but it can lose the case and start competing with the
follower. In this sense, the probability that the patentee wins the trial is directly linked to the
value of the patented technology, which only the innovator knows.
First, we show that an innovator with more valuable technology voluntarily discloses its
private information about the invention despite the rival’s earlier challenge, whereas the one
with less valuable technology reveals nothing. This result is in line with theoretical analyses of
Gick (2008) and Anton and Yao (2002, 2008). The former, which examined signaling via patent
disclosure, lacked an explanation of how exactly the disclosure incurs costs to the innovators,
and the latter studied the sales of idea in the presence of downstream competition based on
a static model. In contrast, we clarify the cost of information disclosure by incorporating the
follower’s challenge and examine the interaction between the decisions of information disclosure
and investment timing based on a continuous‐time dynamic model. This finding is also consistent
with empirical evidence from Graham and Hegde (2015), who investigate inventors’ disclosure
strategy before and after the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), which requires U.S.
patent applications to be made public within 18 months from the filing date, except for those
without a parallel foreign filing. They show that a surprisingly large portion of applicants who
could have opted out of the 18‐month publication enforcement actually chose pre‐grant disclosure
over pre‐grant secrecy.
Furthermore, we show that innovators overinvest in R&D under asymmetric information.
Given the follower’s earlier challenge induced by information disclosure, the leader makes an
R&D investment earlier than it would have under symmetric information, not only because it
can raise more revenue before the rival challenges but also because earlier investment lowers
the amount of information disclosure for more valuable technology. This result is in contrast
to the conventional wisdom that the need to disclose complementary information such as pre‐
grant publication will retard innovation. Aoki and Spiegel (2009) examine the impact of pre‐
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2grant publication in the presence of cumulative innovation and claim that it will lead to fewer
inventions. Gans et al. (2008) focus on the impact of uncertainty during patent pendency, and
show that the hazard rate of achieving a license significantly increases after patents are granted.
We analyze the interaction between the decisions of information disclosure and investment timing
from the dynamics perspective, and show that the need to disclose private information puts the
timing of innovation forward.
Regarding the extent of information disclosure, we find that the more valuable the technology
is and the less bargaining power the innovator has, the more private information its owner
discloses. This result is in line with theoretical analysis by Anton and Yao (2002, 2008) and
empirical evidence from Graham and Hegde (2015). The former investigates the sale of ideas
with downstream competition and showed that the amount of disclosure increases with the
idea’s vaıue. The latter finds that the probability of choosing pre‐grant secrecy over pre‐grant
publication decreases with the value of patents, especially for small inventors. Our model also
shows that the stronger the follower’s challenge is, the more private information the leader
discloses. The follower challenges earlier when its technology substitutes the leader’s one to a
larger extent. Given the imminent challenge, a leader with less valuable technology has more
incentive to pretend that it has more valuable one. Thus, the owner of more innovative technology
has to disclose more information to separate itself from the owner of less valuable one, which
worsens the leader’s firm value.
Lastly, we show that even though the leading innovator suffers losses from information dis‐
closure, total value of the firms in the market may increase under asymmetric information due
to the diffusion of knowledge. The follower can refer to the disclosed information for its own
R&D and save costs for duplicative R&D, which is socially beneficial. As a whole, the benefits
from R&D spillover can dominate the leader’s losses. This result supports the requirement of
pre‐grant publication upon patent application. Cohen et al. (2002) conducted national surveys in
the U.S. and Japan, and found that though innovators’ appropriability is lower, R&D spillovers
are significantly greater in Japan, where the patent system focuses more on the diffusion of
technology. This suggests that a diffusion‐oriented patent system can benefit society as a whole.
2 Models and solutions
2.1 Setup
Suppose there is an upstream leader that can develop new technology and acquire a patent at a
lump‐sum cost c_{L} . A product based on this technology yields revenue flow  \pi_{M}X_{t} with a constant
 \pi_{M} and a demand shock  X_{t} given by a one‐dimensional geometric Brownian motion as follows:
 dX_{t}=\mu X_{t}dt+\sigma X_{t}dW_{t} , (2.1)
where  \mu and  \sigma are positive constants and  (W_{t})_{t\geq 0} is a standard Brownian motion on a filtered
probability space  (\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \Gamma :=(\mathcal{F}_{t})_{t\geq 0}, \mathbb{P}) satisfying the usual conditions. A risk‐free rate is given
by a constant   r>\mu for the finiteness of the value functions. The upstream firm, however,
does not have its own manufacturing facilities, and has to arrange a license contract with a
3downstream firm to profit from the patented technology. Upon the contract, the bargaining
power of the upstream and downstream firms are given by  \beta and   1-\beta , respectively, where
 \beta\in[0,1].
In spite of the right to monopolize the market, there can be a challenge against it. Namely,
an upstream follower can invent around the patented technology, or even make better technology
that makes the leader’s technology obsolete, at a cost  c_{F} . The upstream follower does not have
its own manufacturing facilities either, and has to license it to another downstream firm,  a
downstream follower. Upon this challenge, the leader files a lawsuit, claiming that the follower
has infringed the patent rights. The patentee wins the trial with probability  p\in(0,1) and
maintains its monopolistic position in the market. With probability  1-p , however, it loses the
case; the patent is invalidated by the court’s ruling and they start competing with each other in
the market. Given the duopoly, products based on the technologies of the upstream leader and
follower make revenue flows  \pi_{D}^{L}X_{t} and  \pi_{D}^{F}X_{t} , respectively, where  \pi_{D}  :=\pi_{D}^{L}+\pi_{D}^{F}\leq\pi_{M}.
We can interpret  p as the novelty of the leader’s technology. As Lemley and Shapiro (2005)
note, the overwhelming majority of patent applications in the U.S. ultimately result in an issued
patent and the true novelty of patented technology is examined thoroughly when litigation is
involved. It can also be read as the technology’s value because the innovator’s appropriability
can be measured based on how long it takes for rivals to imitate a firm’s innovation (e.g., Levin
et al. (1987)), and the follower will challenge later for higher  p in our model. We suppose there
are two types of leader’s technology; type  g and type  b , the patents on which win the trial with
probability  p_{g} and  p_{b} , respectively, where  p_{g}>p_{b} . The true novelty, however, is not known to
other parties. Even the innovator can only identify it after the R&D investment. Namely, the
leader makes an R&D investment timing decision without knowing the profitability, and it is
realized as type  g and type  b with probability  q and  1-q , respectively, where  q\in(0,1) .
2.2 Benchmark model: symmetric information
Suppose that the upstream leader acquired patents on its technology of type  i\in\{g, b\} and
arranged a license contract with the downstream leader. Based on the existing technology, the
upstream follower can imitate, or even make better technology that makes the leader’s technology
obsolete, at a cost  c_{F} . Due to the lack of production facilities, the upstream follower also has
to make a license contract and share profits with the downstream follower. Upon the rival’s
challenge, the leader files a lawsuit over infringement and wins the trial with probability  p_{i}.
In other words, the followers can only make profits with probability  1-p_{i} . Thus, given the
investment and the license contract, the upstream and downstream followers challenging the
leader’s type  i technology share the following revenue with each other:
  E[\int_{t}^{\infty}e^{-r(s-t)}(1-p_{\dot{i}})\pi_{D}^{F}X_{S}ds|X_{t}=x]=\frac
{(1-p_{i})\pi_{D}^{F}x}{r-\mu} . (2.2)
Because both the upstream and downstream followers do not have outside options in their
bargaining, the sharing rule is directly linked to their bargaining power,  \beta and   1-\beta , respectively.2
 2We suppose the bargaining power of the upstream and downstream firms is irrelevant to their position in
the market. Namely, both the upstream leader and follower have a bargaining power of  \beta , while the downstream
4To elucidate the dynamics perspective of market competition, we draw on the real options
framework. By the standard argument of real options, we can derive the upstream and down‐
stream followers’ value under symmetric information as follows:
Proposition 1 (Followers’ value under symmetric information) Under symmetric infor‐
mation, value functions of the upstream and downsream followers challenging type  i technology





where the upstream follower’s investment tngger is
 X_{F}^{i}= \frac{\alpha(r-\mu)_{CF}}{(\alpha-1)(1-p;)\beta\pi_{D}^{F}} . (2.5)
PROOF See the appendix of Jeon (2018).
This implies that the upstream follower invests at a cost  c_{F} and makes an offer of licensing to
the downstream folıower when the demand shock reaches the level of  X_{F}^{i} . The offer is accepted
immediately because the downstream follower can raise revenue without any costs. It is natural
that  X_{F}^{b}<X_{F}^{g} holds; given a higher  p , the follower delays the investment until the demand
grows enough to compensate the risk of gaining nothing in spite of the incurred costs. That is,
the monopoly of the patented technology is expected to last longer for a higher  p.
Given these arguments, now we can proceed to the upstream leader’s investment decision
and the license contract with the downstream leader. The leaders’ bargaining differs from that of
the followers because they have outside options. When disagreed, the upstream leader can make
a license contract with the downstream follower, while the downstream leader can wait until the
upstream follower challenges the leader and license the follower’s technology.3 The difference,
however, is that the upstream leader can still be a leader in the industry when the bargaining
breaks down, whereas the downstream leader becomes a follower in that case. The outcome of
the bargaining is as follows:
Proposition 2 (Leaders’ sharing rule under symmetric information) Given demand shock
 X at the timing of bargaining, the downstream leader pays the following royalties per unit for
type  i\in\{g, b\} technology:
  \theta_{i}(X)=\beta[1+(1-\beta)\{1-\frac{\Pi_{i}^{F}(X)}{\Pi_{i}^{L}(X;X)}\}] (2.6)
leader and follower have that of  1-\beta.
 3We implicitly assume that there is no difference between the downstream leader and follower in terms of their
production facilities; both downstream firms can make products based on both upstream firms’ technologies. This
is an out‐of‐equilibrium path, and there should be no confusion regarding the designation of the downstream firms




  \Pi_{i}^{F}(x) :=\frac{(1-p_{i})\pi_{D}^{F}X_{F}^{i}}{r-\mu}(\frac{x}{X_{F}
^{i}})^{\alpha} (2.8)
denote the expected profits of the leader and follower groups for current demand shock  x , respec‐
tively.
PROOF See the appendix of Jeon (20ı8).
It is straightforward to show the following results regarding the sharing rule:
Corollary 1 The per‐unit royalties for the leader’s technology decrease with the demand shock
at which the bargaining is triggered, while the gap between the royalties of type  g and type  b
technologies increases with the bargaining threshold:
  \frac{\partial\theta_{i}(X)}{\partial X}<0 , (2.9)
  \frac{\partial\{\theta_{g}(X)-\theta_{b}(X)\}}{\partial X}>0 . (2.10)
PROOF See the appendix of Jeon (2018).
Given the rival’s challenge, the effective maturity of the leader’s patent decreases as the beginning
of its use is delayed, and thus, (2.9) holds. The relative difference between the effective maturities
of type  g and type  b technologies, however, increases as the technologies’ uses are postponed,
and therefore, (2.10) holds.
Recall that before the investment, the upstream leader only knows the distribution of the
technology’s type. Thus, the upstream leader’s optimization problem under symmetric informa‐
tion is described as follows:
  \sup_{X}q\theta_{g}(X)\Pi_{g}^{L}(x;X)+(1-q)\theta_{b}(X)\Pi_{b}^{L}(x;X)-
C_{L}(\frac{x}{X})^{\alpha} (2.11)
By solving this problem, we can obtain the value functions of the upstream and downstream
leaders as follows:
Proposition 3 (Leaders’ value under symmetric information) Under symmetmc infor‐
mation, the upstream and downstream leaders’ pre‐investment values are






and the upstream leader’s investment trigger  X_{L} ts implicitly determined by solving (2.11) with
the shanng rule of (2.6).
6It follows the same argument of Proposition 1 to derive these results.
The followers’ value functions before the leader’s investment are the expected values of those
from Proposition 1:
 U_{F}(x)=qU_{F}^{g}(x)+(1-q)U_{F}^{b}(x) , (2.16)
 D_{F}(x)=qD_{F}^{g}(x)+(1-q)D_{F}^{b}(x) (2.17)
and we can evaluate total firm value in the market as follows:
 T(x)=L(x)+F(x) (2.18)
where  L(x)=U_{L}(x)+D_{L}(x) and  F(x)=U_{F}(x)+D_{F}(x) denote the value of the leader and
follower groups, respectively.
2.3 Main model: asymmetric information
Suppose that other parties besides the upstream leader are not able to identify the true novelty of
the upstream leader’s technology. Given this uncertainty, the technology’s user will pay royalties
based on its expected value. In other words, the owner of type  g technology raises less revenue
than it should due to incomplete information. Thus, type  g leader is willing to reveal its private
information about the invention so that its user can identify the technology’s true value and
pay a fair amount royalty. For instance, innovators can put the timing of publication of patent
applications forward. After AIPA, every patent application in the U.S. is published within 18
months from the earliest filing date, even if the patent is not granted yet; it can be published
even earlier than that at the applicant’s request. However, the applicant can also request not
to publish it by certifying that it has not and will not be the subject of an application filed
in another country.4 They can also disclose their private information via other mechanisms;
publications via private firms such as IP.com and Research Disclosure, Inc., industry reports,
trade bulletins, technical journals, and postings on their websites (e.g., Hegde and Luo (2017),
Baker and Mezzetti (2005)). In this sense, it is reasonable to suppose that the innovator can
choose the extent of information disclosure at its will.
The disclosed information, however, is inevitably diffused to its rival as well, and accelerates
the challenge by saving the rival’s investment costs. Namely, the upstream follower’s invest‐
ment costs decrease to  (1-\gamma)C_{F} where  \gamma\in[0,1] denotes the degree of the leader’s information
disclosure. Suppose for the moment that information disclosure successfully reveals the technol‐
ogy’s true type. Then, following the argument from Proposition 1, the followers’ values under
asymmetric information are derived as follows:
Proposition 4 (Followers’ value under asymmetric information) Under asymmetric in‐
formation, value functions of the upstream and downstream firms challenging type  i technology
 4See35 U.S. Code §ı22 for the stipulation.





where the upstream follower’s investment  tr gger  \dot{?}s
 X_{F}^{i}( \gamma)-=\frac{\alpha(r-\mu)(1-\gamma)c_{F}}{(\alpha-1)(1-p_{i})
\beta\pi_{D}^{F}} . (2.21)
It is obvious that  X_{F}^{i}(0)- is equal to  X_{F}^{i} and that  X_{F}^{i}(\gamma)- decreases in  \gamma . The latter implies
that the signaling of technology’s quality via information disclosure comes at the cost of a
competitor’s earlier challenge. The relative costs of the rival’s earlier challenge, however, depend
on the technology’s novelty, and this enables the owner of type  g technology to separate itself
from type  b innovator by disclosing private information.
Now let us proceed to the leader’s decision of investment timing and information disclosure.
Suppose the upstream leader invested at the trigger  X and observed its technology’s type. Given
higher royalties for type  g technology, the owner of type  b technology has an incentive to mimic
type  g innovator’s behavior so that it deceives the downstream firm and receives higher royalties
than it should. Even though the downstream firm cannot identify the technology’s true novelty
directly, it can observe the disclosed information. If the upstream leader with type  i technology
discloses a fraction  \gamma of its private information and receives the per‐unit royalties  \theta based on
the perceived type, we can evaluate the firm value as follows:
  \overline{U}_{L}^{i}(X;\gamma, \theta)=\frac{\theta}{r-\mu}[\pi_{M}X-(1-p_{i})
(\pi_{M}-\pi_{D}^{L})X_{F}^{i}(\gamma)-(\frac{X}{X_{F}^{i}(\gamma)-})^{\alpha}] ,  \forall i\in\{g, b\} . (2.22)
Note that even though the royalties are based on the perceived type, the probability of winning
the patent trial depends on the technology’s true novelty. Thus, the cost of information disclosure
depends on the innovator’s type, and the following result holds:
Proposition 5 (Single‐crossing condition) The innovator with type  g technology finds it
less costly to disclose its private information than the owner of type  b technology does such that
the single‐crossing condition holds:
  \frac{\partial}{\partial p_{i}}(\frac{\partial\theta}{\partial\gamma}
\frac{\gamma}{\theta})<0 . (2.23)
PROOF See the appendix of Jeon (2018).
For this reason, type  g leader can reveal its private information and separate itself from type  b
innovator, receiving a fair royalty from the downstream leader.
When information disclosure  \gamma_{i} for type  i technology reveals the technology’s true type,
the outcome of royalties bargaining is similar to the one from Proposition 2, except that the
follower’s challenge is accelerated by the disclosed information:
8Proposition 6 (Leaders’ bargaining under asymmetric information) Given demand shock
 X at the timing of bargaining and information disclosure  \gamma_{l} , the downstream leader pays the fol‐
lowing royalties per unit for type  i\in\{g, b\} technology:
  \overline{\theta}_{\dot{i}}(X, \gamma_{i})=\beta [1+({\imath}-\beta)\{1-\frac{
\Pi_{i}^{F}(X,\gamma_{i})-}{\Pi_{i}^{L}(X,\gamma_{\dot{i}};X)-}\}] (2.24)
where
  \Pi_{i}^{L}(x, \gamma_{i};X)- :=\frac{\pi_{M}X}{r-\mu}(\frac{x}{X})^{\alpha}-
\frac{(1-p_{i})(\pi_{M}-\pi_{D}^{L})X_{F}^{i}(\gamma_{\dot{i}})-}{r-\mu}
(\frac{x}{X_{F}^{i}(\gamma_{i})-})^{\alpha} (2.25)
  \Pi_{i}^{F}(x, \gamma_{i})- :=\frac{(1-p_{i})\pi_{D}FX_{F}^{i}(\gamma_{\dot{i}
})-}{r-\mu}(\frac{x}{X_{F}^{i}(\gamma_{i})-})^{\alpha} (2.26)
denote the expected profits of the leader and follower groups for current demand shock  x and
information disclosure  \gamma_{i} , respectively.
In addition to Corollary 1, which holds under asymmetric information as well, the following
results hold regarding the sharing rule and information disclosure:
Corollary 2 The per‐unit royalties for the leader’s technology decrease with the degree of infor‐
mation disclosure, whnde the gap between the royalties of type  g and type  b technologies increases
with the information disclosure:
  \frac{\partial\overline{\theta}_{i}(X,\gamma)}{\partial\gamma}<0 , (2.27)
  \frac{a\{\overline{e}_{g}(X,\gamma)-\overline{\theta}_{b}(X,\gamma)\}}
{\partial\gamma}>0 . (2.28)
PROOF See the appendix of Jeon (2018).
As the leader reveals information, the timing of the rival’s challenge is put forward, which
shortens the effective maturity of the leader’s patent. Thus, (2.27) holds. The relative difference
between the effective maturities of type  g and type  b technologies, however, rather increases as
the rival’s challenge is accelerated by information disclosure, and this leads to (2.28). In other
words, type  b owner’s incentive to mimic type  g ’s behavior becomes even stronger as information
is disclosed, which makes type  g ’s separation more costly.
Given this sharing rule, the owner of type  b technology gives up mimicking type  g innovator
when the following holds:
 \overline{\theta}_{b}(X, 0)\Pi_{b}^{L}(X, 0;X)-\geq\overline{\theta}_{g}(X, 
\gamma)\Pi_{b}^{L}(X, \gamma;X)- . (2.29)
The left‐hand side of (2.29) is type  b innovator’s value when it does not disclose any private
information, leaving the follower’s investment timing same as that under symmetric information,
and receives fair royalties. The right‐hand side corresponds to type  b innovator’s value when it
discloses  \gamma of its private information, which accelerates the rival’s challenge, and is perceived as
type  g , receiving higher royalties than it should. The binding case of (2.29) yields  \overline{\gamma} , over which
9type  b leader gives up mimicking type  g because of the burden of the rival’s earlier challenge.
In other words, type  b leader chooses to disclose its private information and pretends to be
of type  g when type  g innovator discloses less than  \overline{\gamma} . Note that the degree of information
disclosure  \overline{\gamma} depends on the investment trigger  X . As will be shown shortly, they are determined
simultaneously and interact with each other.
Similarly, type  g leader’s incentive compatibility condition is as follows:
 \overline{\theta}_{g}(X, \gamma)\Pi_{g}^{L}(X, \gamma;X)-\geq\overline{\theta}_
{b}(X, 0)\Pi_{g}^{L}(X, 0;X)- . (2.30)
We can derive  \overline{\gamma}_{\max} , over which type  g gives up separating itself from type  b from the binding
case of (2.30). It is obvious that the separating equilibrium exists when  \overline{\gamma}\leq\overline{\gamma}_{\max} . After the
realization of technology’s type, the upstream leader discloses its private information by the
following rule:
Proposition 7 (Information disclosure) The owner of type  g technology discloses a fraction
 \overline{\gamma} of its private information derived from (2.29), whereas type  b innovator reveals nothing:
 \gamma_{g}=\overline{\gamma}, \gamma_{b}=0 (2.31)
provided  \overline{\gamma}\leq\overline{\gamma}_{\max} holds.
This result amounts to the upstream follower’s investment triggers of  X_{F}^{g}(\overline{\gamma})- and  X_{F}^{b}(0)-(=X_{F}^{b})
and the royalties of  \overline{\theta}_{g}(X,\overline{\gamma}) and  \overline{\theta}_{b}(X, 0) for each type of technology, respectively.
Given these arguments, we can formulate the upstream leader’s optimization problem under
asymmetric information as follows:
  \sup_{X,\gamma}q\overline{\theta}_{g}(X, \gamma)\Pi_{g}^{L}(x, \gamma;X)-+(1-
q)\overline{\theta}_{b}(X, 0)\Pi_{b}^{L}(x, 0;X)--c_{L}(\frac{x}{X})^{\alpha} (2.32)
subject to (2.29) and (2.30). The upstream leader choose the investment trigger  X and the degree
of information disclosure for type  g technology  \gamma without knowing the technology’s quality. After
the investment, which incurs a cost of  c_{L} , type  g technology is obtained with probability  q and
the innovator discloses a fraction  \gamma of private information to show that the technology is worth
royalties of  \overline{\theta}_{g}(X, \gamma) , in spite of the costs of earlier challenge by the rival. With probability  1-q,
however, the technology is found to be of type  b and the firm does not disclose any private
information, receiving royalties of  \overline{\theta}_{b}(X, 0) .
In the separating equilibrium, as described in Proposition 7, the owner of more valuable
technology discloses its private information about the invention, while the inventor with less
valuable technology reveals nothing. This is consistent with the results from theoretical analyses
by Gick (2008) and Anton and Yao (2002, 2008). The former investigates innovators’ signaling
via patent disclosure in the presence of upstream competition, and shows that more advanced
firms disclose in spite of the costs, while less advanced firms disclose nothing. The paper, however,
did not provide a detailed description of how exactly the disclosure incurs a cost to them. In
contrast, we illustrate the cost of information disclosure by incorporating the follower’s challenge
against the leader’s monopolistic position in the market. The latter, Anton and Yao (2002, 2008)
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studied the sale of ideas in the presence of downstream competition, and showed that the seller
with more valuable idea reveals more private information to separate itself from the one with
less valuable idea. Their works, however, drew on a static model, whereas we elucidate the
dynamics perspective of technology market and analyze how the decisions of investment timing
and information disclosure interact with each other, as will be shown in the following section.
This result is also in line with empirical evidence from Graham and Hegde (2015). As men‐
tioned earlier, patent applicants who have not and will not apply for foreign patents can request
confidentiality until the patent is granted. They investigate patent applicants’ decision about
disclosure before and after the enactment of AIPA and find that a large proportion of applicants
without a parallel foreign filling, that is, those who could have opted out of the 18‐month pub‐
lication, actually chose pre‐grant disclosure over pre‐grant secrecy.5 Namely, a large number of
innovators have disclosed their private information on purpose. The authors suggest that patent
disclosure benefits inventors, such as by credibly convincing their licensees, competitors, and
investors. Mihm et al. (2015) also claims that a patenting firm discloses its research activities
and gives signals about the quality of solutions resulting from its R&D efforts. Our model pro‐
vides a theoretical framework to clarify the mechanism of innovators’ signaling to licensees and
competitors via information disclosure.
To sum up, we can calculate the leaders’ value functions under asymmetric information as
follows:
Proposition 8 (Leaders’ value under asymmetric information) Under asymmetric infor‐
mation, the upstream and downstream leaders’ pre‐investment values are
 \overline{U}_{L}(x)=q\overline{U}_{L}^{g}(x)+(1-q)\overline{U}_{L}^{b}(x) , (2.33)
 \overline{D}_{L}(x)=q\overline{D}_{L}^{g}(x)+(1-q)D_{L}^{-b}(x) (2.34)
where





and the upstream leader’s investment trigger  \overline{X}_{L} and information disclosure  \gamma_{i} are implicitly
determined by solving (2.32) subject to (2.29) and (2.30) with the sharing rule of (2.24).
The followers’ value functions before the leader’s investment are expected values of those
from Proposition 4:
 \overline{U}_{F}(x)=q\overline{U}_{F}^{g}(x)+(1-q)\overline{U}_{F}^{b}(x) , (2.37)
 \overline{D}_{F}(x)=q\overline{D}_{F}^{g}(x)+(1-q)D_{F}^{-b}(x) (2.38)
which amounts to the following total firm value under asymmetric information:
 \overline{T}(x)=\overline{L}(x)+\overline{F}(x) (2.39)
5They find that conditional on choosing against foreign protection (about 50% of the applications), about 85%
of inventors chose pre‐grant disclosure.
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where  \overline{L}(x)=\overline{U}_{L}(x)+\overline{D}_{L}(x) and  \overline{F}(x)=\overline{U}_{F}(x)+\overline{D}_{F}(x) denote the value of the leader and
follower groups under asymmetric information, respectively.
3 Comparative statics and discussion
We adopt the following parameters as a benchmark case for comparative statics:
 r=0.05, \mu=0.02, \sigma=0.2, p_{g}=2/3, p_{b}=1/3, \beta=0.5,
 C_{L}=C_{F}=2 ,  \pi M=\pi D= ı,  \pi_{D}^{F}=\pi_{D},  x_{0}=0.1.
3.1 Asymmetry in technology’s novelty
First, we examine how the asymmetry in the novelty of the leader’s technology affects the
investment timing of the upstream leader and follower and the degree of information disclosure.
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Figure 1: Comparative statics with respect to the asymmetry in technology’s novelty
We can observe the following result from Panel (d) of Figure 1:
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Observation 1 The more valuable the technology is, the more its owner discloses private in‐
formation about it. That is,  \overline{\gamma} strictly increases in  p_{g}.
This is because type  b innovator has stronger incentives to pretend to have type  g technology
when  p_{g} is much higher than  p_{b} . Note that the royalties for type  g strictly increase in  p_{g} (Panel
(c)). This result is consistent with theoretical analysis by Anton and Yao (2002, 2008) and
empirical evidence from Graham and Hegde (2015). The former investigates the sale of ideas
in the presence of downstream competition and shows that the amount of disclosure increases
with the ideas’ value. The latter shows that applicants of the patents with more values are more
likely to choose pre‐grant disclosure over pre‐grant secrecy.6
Meanwhile, this result is in contrast to the argument from Anton and Yao (2003, 2004). They
examine duopoly competition with asymmetric information on the cost structure and show that
inventors with better technology discloses less knowledge. The difference in the results comes
from the incentive to disclose in their models. They suppose that the leader transfers knowledge
to the follower on purpose to affect the follower’s capacity decision. In our model, the upstream
leader discloses its private information so that the downstream leader can pay fair royalties, and
it is inevitably diffused to the follower.
It is obvious that the disclosed information affects the investment timing of both the upstream
leader and follower, and Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 1 show the following result:
Observation 2 Under asymmetric information, not only the upstream follower challenging type
 g technology, the beneficiary of information disclosure, but also the upstream leader invests earlier
than they would have under symmetric information. That is,  \overline{X}_{F}^{g} and  \overline{X}_{L} are lower than  X_{F}^{g}
and  X_{L} , respectively.
Given information disclosure  \overline{\delta} , it is obvious that the follower challenging type  g technology
invests earlier; it can save the investment costs for duplicative R&D by referring to the disclosed
information. Note that not only  X_{F}^{g} and  \overline{X}_{F}^{g} but also the gap between them strictly increases
in  p_{g} due to the increase of  \overline{\gamma} (Panel (d)).
The leader’s overinvestment in R&D under asymmetric information can be construed as
follows. The leader group has to raise enough revenue before the follower group’s challenge, of
which timing is put forward due to the revealed information. Fh om the perspective of optimiza‐
tion problems in (2.1ı) and (2.32),  \Pi_{g}^{L}(x, \gamma;X)- is lower than  \Pi_{9}^{L}(x;X) given demand shock
 X , and thus, the leader has an incentive to choose  \overline{X}_{L} lower than  X_{L} . Furthermore, earlier
investment raises the royalties  \overline{\theta}_{g}(X, \gamma) and  \overline{\theta}_{b}(X, 0) in (2.32) via multiple channels: first,  a
lower investment threshold directly raises them by (2.9) from Corollary 1, and second, a lower
investment trigger reduces  \overline{6} , the minimum amount of information disclosure necessary for the
separation, by disincentivizing type  b owner to mimic type  g , which can be inferred from (2.10)
of Corollary 1, and lastly, a lower level of disclosure raises  \overline{\theta}_{g}(X, \gamma) by (2.27) from Corollary 2.
6They use three different measures to evaluate the value of patents: the number of claims, the amount of
maintenance fees, and the number of citations. The resuıt was robust in that all three measures pointed in the
same direction.
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Earlier investment in R&D in the presence of information disclosure is in contrast with the
conventional wisdom that the need to disclose complementary information will retard innovation.
Aoki and Spiegel (2009) examine the implications of pre‐grant publication, taking cumulative
innovation into account, and claim that it will eventually lead to fewer inventions. Gans et al.
(2008) point out that uncertainty from the process of patent grants impedes the transfer of tech‐
nology, showing that the hazard rate for achieving a cooperative licensing significantly increases
after patents are granted. We analyze the interaction of the decisions of information disclosure
and investment timing, taking the dynamics perspective into account, and show that innovators’
voluntary disclosure under asymmetric information accelerates the innovators’ R&D investment.
3.2 Firms’ bargaining power
Now we examine how the firms’ bargaining power changes the arguments of our model. We let
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Figure 2: Comparative statics with respect to the bargaining power
We can see the following result from Panels (b) and (d) of Figure 2:
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Observation 3 The less bargaining power the innovator has, the more it discloses its private
information. That is, the amount of information revealed by type  g leader strictly decreases in
 \beta , which leads to a decrease in the gap between  X_{F}^{g} and  X_{F}^{g}-
When  \beta is low, the royalties for innovators will be low, which makes type  b innovators more
eager to pretend to be of type  g . Thus, the owner of type  g technology has to reveal more private
information to separate itself from type  b owner. This finding is also consistent with Graham
and Hegde (2015) in that their result is more significant for small innovators, whose bargaining
power is expected to be low.
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Figure 2: Comparative statics with respect to the bargaining power
Regarding the firms’ values, we can observe the following result from from Panels (e) through
(h) of Figure 2:
Observation 4 The upstream firms’ value strictly increases in  \beta , whereas the downstream
firms’ values are not monotone with respect to their bargaining power,   1-\beta . The total value of
the firms in the market is concave with respect to  \beta.
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When  \beta is significantly low, the invention of technology, from which the downstream firms make
revenue, is delayed significantly (Panels (a) and (b)). Thus, their expected values do not increase
despite the low royalties for ıow  \beta . This leads to the result in Panel (k): the concavity between
 \beta and the total value of the firms in the market. This implies that sociaı welfare worsens when
either a licensor or a licensee has an overwhelming position in the market. This result can be read
from the context of Shapiro (2008), which notes that excessive rewards provided to patent holders
can rather stifle innovation. Jeon and Nishihara (2017) investigate the bilateral hold‐up problem
in a vertically separated market and also find that overcompensation for innovators worsens
social welfare by delaying the technology licensing. Though we do not explicitly consider the
government’s policies, it is natural to suppose that bargaining power of the firms in technology
market is directly linked to the government’s policies on intellectual property rights. In this
sense, our model suggests that the government’s policies should keep a balance between the
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Figure 2: Comparative statics with respect to the bargaining power
Furthermore, we can observe the following result from Panel (k) of Figure 2:
16
Observation 5 When  \beta is significantly low, the total value of the firms in the market under
asymmetric information  qS higher than that under symmetric information.
It is of special interest that social welfare can improve due to information asymmetry. This is
also directly associated with Panel (d), the extent of information disclosure under asymmetric
information. As noted by Observation 3, type  g innovator reveals more information when its
bargaining power is low. In other words, more investment costs are saved in the society as a
whole when the upstream firm has less bargaining power. Though the leaders suffer losses from
the rival’s earlier chalıenge, the followers’ benefit can dominate them. This finding supports the
requirement of pre‐grant publication from the perspective of R&D spillover. National surveys
in the U.S. and Japan by Cohen et al. (2002) show that the diffusion‐oriented patent system
in Japan leads to greater R&D spillover at the cost of less appropriability for innovators. Our
model suggests that the gains from the diffusion of knowledge are greater and can even dominate
the patentees’ losses when innovators have low bargaining power.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined a license contract in a vertically separated market in the presence
of a rival’s challenge and information asymmetry regarding technologies’ values. The innovator
with more valuable technology voluntarily discloses its private information about the invention
to separate itself from the one with less valuable technology so that it can raise a fair royalty
payment. The disclosed information, however, is diffused to the follower as well, and leads to
an earlier challenge by saving the rival’s investment costs for duplicative R&D. The inventor’s
voluntary disclosure of its private information is consistent with empirical evidence of U.S. inven‐
tors’ strategies after AIPA; a choice of pre‐grant publication over pre‐grant secrecy. The amount
of disclosed information increases with the asymmetry of a technology’s novelty and decreases
with the innovator’s bargaining power. We also showed that the timing of the leader’s innovation
moves forward under asymmetric information, which is in contrast to the conventional wisdom
that information disclosure will stifle innovation. In spite of the leader’s losses from the rival’s
earlier challenge, the total value of the firms in the market may increase under asymmetric infor‐
mation by avoiding investment in duplicative R&D, especially when the innovator’s bargaining
power is low.
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